California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from The People v. Hutchins, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 643, 90 Cal. App. 4th 1308 (Cal. App. 2001):
"We reject [appellant's] speculative assumption that the instruction had a chilling effect on the jurors' deliberations, inhibiting the kind of free expression and interaction among jurors that is so important to the deliberative process. There is no warrant for that view on this record." (People v. Molina, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1336.) There is no reasonable basis for any inference that the subject jury instruction had any impact prejudicial to appellant. We conclude any presumed error in giving CALJIC No. 17.41.1 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In sentencing appellant on his second degree murder conviction, the trial court imposed an additional term of 25 years to life for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm proximately causing the death of the victim of the shooting, as required by section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The trial court was faced with an enhancement statute specifically setting out substantially increased prison sentences for the use of a firearm in the commission of designated felonies, including murder. (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 493; 12022.53, subds. (a)(1), (d).) Appellant contends that by imposing both a 15-year to life term for the second degree murder and an additional enhancement penalty of 25 years to life pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d), the trial court punished him twice for the same conduct-firing the shots that killed the deceased victim. Thus, he insists the trial court's imposition of the additional statutory term was in violation of section 654, because he had already been punished for murder under count 1 "for precisely the same act that constituted this enhancement." Appellant is wrong.
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