Is an attorney bound by a stipulation even when the court considers imposition of harsher sanctions than those stipulated to by the attorney and the state bar?

This court stated in Inniss v. State Bar (1978) 20 Cal.3d 552, 143 Cal.Rptr. 408, 573 P.2d 852, that an attorney is bound by factual recitals in a stipulation even when the court considers imposition of harsher sanctions than those stipulated to by the attorney and the board. "(T)he stipulated facts may not be contradicted; otherwise, the stipulation procedure would serve little or no purpose, requiring a remand for further evidentiary hearings whenever an attorney deems it advisable to challenge factual recitals." (Id., at p. 555, 143 Cal.Rptr. 408, 573 P.2d 852.) However, an [28 Cal.3d 471] exception to the general rule was expressly recognized in Inniss. "On the other hand, fundamental fairness seems to require us to relieve an attorney from the legal conclusions to which he may have agreed solely because the recommended punishment seemed to

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