Is a third strike offender deemed ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36 because he is a felon in possession of a firearm?

Second, the history of Proposition 36 does not support defendant's contention. The phrase "during the commission of the current offense" in subdivision (iii) indicates that being armed must accompany an offense other than being a felon in possession of a firearm. In Proposition 36, "voters rendered ineligible for resentencing not only narrowly drawn categories of third strike offenders who committed particular, specified offenses or types of offenses, but also broadly inclusive categories of offenders who, during commission of their crimesand regardless of those crimes' basic statutory elementsused a firearm, were armed with a firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury to another person. Significantly, however, those categories, while broad, are not unlimited. Voters easily could have expressly disqualified any defendant who committed a gun-related felony or who possessed a firearm, had they wanted to do so. This is not what voters did, however." (People v. Blakely (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1055 (Blakely).) The Blakely court examined Proposition 36 ballot materials and explained how the "materials expressly distinguished between dangerous criminals who were deserving of life sentences, and petty criminals (such as shoplifters and those convicted of simple drug possession) who posed little or no risk to the public and did not deserve life sentences." (Id. at pp. 1056-1057.) Since a felon "who has been convicted of two or more serious and/or violent felonies in the past, and most recently had a firearm readily available for use, simply does not pose little or no risk to the public," he is the type of dangerous criminal deemed ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36. (Blakely, at p. 1057.)