Does being a felon in possession of a firearm make a defendant ineligible for resentencing?

being a felon in possession of a firearm make a defendant ineligible for resentencing. (See People v. White, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364.) For another, the electorate apparently wished ineligibility to turn on whether the defendant used or was armed with a firearm or weapon, not whether he or she was convicted of a firearm possession crime or a firearm enhancement was found true. Section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii) facilitates this goal, whereas simply listing statutory sections would not. We also disagree that the phrase "during the commission of the current offense" is meaningless unless the current offense is "something to which the arming attaches," as Bloodsaw suggests. The armed-during-the-commission language in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii) makes clear that mere possession of a firearm without arming is not a disqualifying crime. (See People v. White, supra, at p. 1364.)

Bloodsaw further contends that a comparison of the language in section 667, subdivisions (e)(2)(C)(i), (ii), and (iii) indicates the electorate intended to exclude firearm possession offenses from subdivision (iii). He points out that subdivisions (i) and (ii) begin by stating, "[t]he current offense is," whereas subdivision (iii) begins with the phrase, "[d]uring the commission of the current offense." He urges this "change in structure is telling" because where the electorate intended to exclude specific offenses the statute so states, but where the intent was to "exclude an offense only if something beyond its mere commission occurs, it states 'during the commission of' the offense something else happens." We do not find this significant. First, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. Under these circumstances there is no need for construction. (People v. Blakely, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1053.) Even if we agreed

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