Is a parole officer permitted a search and seizure of a parolee's home?

'The administration of the parole system must be realistic, and not strangled in technical niceties. A parole officer's physical apprehension of his prisoner for suspected violation of parole is not an 'arrest' in the sense that a peace officer arrests a private individual suspected of a crime but a mere transfer of the subject from constructive custody into acutal or physical custody.' (People v. Denne (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 499, 510, 297 P.2d 451, 458.)

In People v. Hernandez, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 40 Cal.Rptr. 100, the defendant was convicted of heroin possession. On appeal, he contended that the heroin in his automobile was uncovered as the result of an unreasonable search and seizure by his parole officer and four narcotics agents, and hence that it was inadmissible in proof of guilt. The court said: 'The decisive question in this case is not whether the parole officer had probable cause for an arrest and incidental search, but whether his paroled prisoner could invoke constitutional barrriers against the search.' (p. 148, 40 Cal.Rptr. p. 103.) After referring to the fact that approximately one-half of all California parolees return to prison within five years, either as the result of parole revocation or a new felony commitment, the court said: 'Criminal acts by parolees evoke public resentment and criticism of the parole authorities, usually stemming from failure to understand the purpose and operation of an enlighted parole system. Close supervision, surveillance and control not only minimize the social risks inherent in parole, but safeguard the system for the sake of those who make good. Intense scrutiny by the correctional authorities is a vital ingredient of a publicly acceptable parole system. For the purpose of maintaining the restraints and social safeguards accompanying the parolee's status, the authorities may subject him, his home and his effects to such constant or occasional inspection and search as may seem advisable to them. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the parallel guaranty in article I, section 19, of the California Constitution blocks that scrutiny. He may not assert these guaranties against the correctional authorities who supervise him on parole. [Citation.] If this constitutional fact strips him of constitutional protection against invasions of privacy by his parole officer, the answer is that he has at least as much protection as he had within the prison walls. He did not possess this guaranty in prison and it was not restored to him when the gates of parole opened.' (pp. 149-150, 40 Cal.Rptr. p. 104.) The court stated: 'We conclude that the requirement of reasonable or probable cause does not apply to search of a paroled prisoner when conducted by his parole supervisors.' (pp. 150-151, 40 Cal.Rptr. p. 104.)

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