In what circumstances will a defense expert be allowed to testify at trial on the effect of stress on eyewitness identification?

of the trial court (People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157, 160, 726 N.Y.S.2d 361, 750 N.E.2d 63 [2001] ). Such decision should be guided by whether the proffered expert testimony would aid a lay jury in reaching a verdict (id. at 162, 726 N.Y.S.2d 361, 750 N.E.2d 63 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). We have acknowledged, however, that

where [a] case turns on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, it is an abuse of discretion for [the] trial court to exclude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications if that testimony is (1) relevant to the witness's identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror (People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 452, 835 N.Y.S.2d 523, 867 N.E.2d 374 [2007] ).

Under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing the defense expert to testify with regard to the effect of stress on the reliability of eyewitness identification. The People sought a ruling at trial concerning the parameters of the defense expert's testimony. The defense failed to submit any evidence demonstrating that its expert's testimony on the topic of event stress met the reliability concerns of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923).

In any event, the trial court did not wholly preclude the defense expert from

[49 N.E.3d 710]