In what circumstances have peremptory challenges been exercised against prospective jurors for cause at the challenge stage of the jury selection process?

Here, we are presented with exclusion of prospective jurors for cause at the challenge stage of the jury selection procedure. Such exclusion was not, however, "systematic" within the meaning of the cases above cited. (Cf., People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748, where the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against black jurors on the ground of "group bias" alone.) By way of contrast, the prospective jurors here were excluded on the basis of their "individual" bias against imposing the death penalty in every case regardless of the specific evidence presented. Further, these jurors unlike the jurors in Witherspoon were not excluded for voicing "general objections" to the death penalty; rather, their exclusion was exercised when it became clear that their objection to the death penalty was so individualized that it would preclude them from ever evaluating the specific evidence before them in a dispassionate, objective way.

One of the primary purposes of the representative cross-section rule is to achieve "overall impartiality" in the jury selection process by insuring that the initial pool of veniremen reflects "the interaction of the diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experiences." (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 276, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) Likewise, the goal of impartiality is furthered at the challenge stage of the process by insuring the removal of prospective jurors who entertain a "specific bias" concerning the particular case on trial or the parties or witnesses who will participate in it. (Id., at p. 274, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) We believe that inclusion of veniremen who have a "specific bias" works at odds with the "overall impartiality" the jury selection process seeks to achieve. Therefore we disagree with defendant's assertion that inclusion of veniremen who admit being specifically biased against the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of the evidence introduced at the trial, is dictated by the representative cross-section rule.

Accordingly, we hold that where, as in this case, there has been no showing of "systematic" exclusion of prospective jurors at either the initial venire/jury pool stage or at the later challenge stage of the jury selection process and where individual veniremen have been challenged for cause upon a showing that they entertain a "specific bias" precluding them from performing their jury duty with impartiality, there is no violation of defendant's constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. Consequently, the "cognizable group" analysis of Rubio v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal.3d 93, 98, 154 Cal.Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595, is inapplicable to the case under review.