How have the courts interpreted a waiver declaration in the context of criminal history?

12 Without particularly relying on the vagueness of defendant's declaration, the People argue that the two-year delay, viewed in the light of defendant's criminal background, proves conclusively, on the face of his application, that he knew of his rights all along or, alternatively, that he has known of them long enough to have waived them as a matter of law. On the first point we can only echo the statement of the court in Davis v. United States (6th Cir. 1972) 464 F.2d 1009, 1014: 'This case demonstrates the fallacy of relying upon a defendant's supposed knowledge for finding a waiver. The previous criminal experience of a defendant is not a factual springboard from which courts may perfunctorily catapult to the conclusion that the defendant possesses the requisite knowledge to prosecute his appeal within the narrow confines of the federal rules.' We need not decide, however, whether after a hearing, a trier of fact could find that the People have discharged their initial burden of going forward (Evid.Code, 550) by appropriate inferences which may be drawn from an examination of defendant's background. The question of waiver cannot possibly be decided in favor of the People until the time when defendant started to sleep on known rights is properly established.