How have courts interpreted the word "knowingly" in the context of Section 2244(b) of the Criminal Code?

By applying the word "knowingly" only to the portion of 2244(b) that is expressly defined as "intentional touching," see Opin. at 1218, the majority's reading of "knowingly" thus wrongly renders that word "nonsensical and superfluous," thereby violating "one of the most basic interpretive canons," namely, "that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant." Corley v. United States , 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (simplified). The only non-superfluous role that the word "knowingly" can have in 2244(b) is to modify the entire phrase "knowingly engages in sexual contact with another person without that other person's

[980 F.3d 1256]

permission"including the final adverbial prepositional phrase. On this basis alone, the only viable reading of 2244(b) is that it requires the Government to prove that the defendant "knowingly" acted "without that other person's permission." See Jones v. United States , 529 U.S. 848, 857, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000) ("Judges should hesitate to treat statutory terms in any setting as surplusage, and resistance should be heightened when the words describe an element of a criminal offense." (simplified)).