How have courts interpreted section 164.395 of the Criminal Code in the context of sexual assault cases?

To be sure, where "[t]he government contends that such a literal application of the statute is not realistic," we must "consider whether [state] courts have interpreted the scope of [the statute of conviction] more narrowly so as to make it applicable only to conduct" consistent with the federal analogue. Cerezo , 512 F.3d at 116768 ; accord Cortez-Guillen v. Holder , 623 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 2010). Oregon law does recognize that "intervening time, distance, and events may well break the link between the theft and the subsequent use of force." Tolbert , 433 P.3d at 506. But that principle does not constrain section 164.395"so as to make it applicable only to conduct" involving a nonconsensual taking. Cerezo , 512 F.3d at 116768. Even with the "immediately after" limitation, it is evident from the examples discussed above that the use or threatened use of force need not occur "in the presence of the owner" and "negate consent," as the majority suggests. Maj. Op. at 904.