How have courts interpreted the scope of the three strikes law?

Remand for a new Romero hearing is required where the record affirmatively reflects that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 507, 530-532, & fn. 13.) The record here presents no such problem; the trial court knew the scope of its discretion. The trial court's statement in denying to strike the strike priors reflects that the court recognized its discretionary authority but concluded that the circumstances were not "extraordinary" to deem defendant outside the spirit of the three strikes law. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378.) Defendant has continued his life of crime, "engaging in the exact same conduct again," as stated by the trial court. We find no abuse of discretion. (See 33 Cal.4th at p. 374.)

As defendant contends, the abstract of judgment erroneously reflects that conduct credits were awarded pursuant to section 4019 instead of section 2933.1. We also note that the abstract erroneously lists one enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) for 15 years. Defendant had three, five years for each, for a total of 15 years. We will order the abstract corrected accordingly. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)