How have courts interpreted the implied consent of a driver who refuses to take a blood test?

Plaintiff maintains he did not refuse to take a chemical test, although he concedes that when advised a blood test was the only available option at the hospital he said, "I will take a breath test." "There is a strong public policy against the nightmare of drunk driving. Thus, the implied consent law should be liberally construed to effect its purpose, which is to swiftly and accurately identify drunk drivers. [Citation.] [] Consequently, the driver should clearly and unambiguously manifest the consent required by the law. Consent which is not clear and unambiguous may be deemed a refusal. The determinative factor as to whether there is a refusal is not the arrestee's subjective state of mind, but rather the objective, fair meaning to be distilled from his words and conduct. [Citation.] A qualified or conditional consent is a refusal. [Citation.]" (Carrey v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1265, 1270-1271.) Here, the objective, fair meaning of defendant's insistence on taking an unavailable test is that he refused to take a blood test.

Plaintiff argues he was denied due process because probable cause was needed to stop his vehicle and he "was prevented from making any arguments or discussing the alleged speeding at all." This "misstates the legal standard. Reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation or other criminal activity justifies a traffic stop; probable cause is not needed. [Citations.]" (People v. Watkins (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408.)

Moreover, a hearing officer's ruling at a driver's license suspension hearing is presumed correct and may not be avoided based on a claim the driver was denied due process "without some showing of unfairness." (Poland v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1135.) Plaintiff fails to cite any authority or make any showing of unfairness, allowing us to treat the contention as waived. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)