How have courts interpreted the definition of a "sexually violent predator" under the California Sexual Prosecutions Act?

in a degree constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of others.' [Citation.] The phrase, 'danger to the health and safety of others,' is accompanied by language making clear that proof of a 'recent overt act' or crime 'in custody' is not required. [Citation.]" (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1144, fn. omitted.)

"[T]he Legislature could reasonably conclude that the evidentiary methods contemplated by the Act are sufficiently reliable and accurate to accomplish its narrow and important purpose - confining and treating mentally disordered individuals who have demonstrated their inability to control specific sexually violent behavior through the commission of similar prior crimes. As noted, the Act precludes commitment based solely on evidence of such prior crimes. [Citation.]" (Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1164.)

". . . California's statute inherently embraces and conveys the need for a dangerous mental condition characterized by impairment of behavioral control. As we have seen, the SVPA accomplishes this purpose by defining a sexually violent predator to include the requirement of a diagnosed mental disorder [citation] affecting the emotional or volitional capacity [citation], which predisposes one to commit criminal sexual acts so as to render the person a menace to the health and safety of others [citation], such that the person is 'likely [to] engage in sexually violent criminal behavior' [citation]. [Citation.] [] . . . California's SVPA states no category of committable disorder which does not expressly require a dangerous effect on emotional or volitional capacity. We are persuaded that a jury instructed in the language of California's statute must necessarily understand the need for serious difficulty in controlling behavior." (People v. Williams (2003) 31 Cal.4th 757, 774, fn. omitted.)

Page 10

2. Discussion.