How have appellate courts dealt with the issue of estoppel by deed in a consolidated condemnation action?

Another appellate court, without comment, reports that two consolidated condemnation actions were tried jointly but that the trial was divided into two parts--the first for court consideration of the state's affirmative legal defenses, the second for jury determination of the value of the interest taken. (Mehl v. People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 710, 714-715, 119 Cal.Rptr. 625, 532 P.2d 489.) While the issue of estoppel by deed would clearly be equitable, the trial court also determined the special defense of the statute of limitations.

In Stevens v. Kelley (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 318, 319-320, 134 P.2d 56, an illegitimate child, through her guardian ad litem, sued her alleged father for support. In his answer the defendant pleaded a former adjudication as a defense to the action, in that his lack of paternity had been determined in a prior action brought by the child's mother. (Id. at p. 320, 134 P.2d 56.) The trial court rejected the plea of res judicata, and the appellate court reversed. (Id. at pp. 322, 328, 134 P.2d 56.) Plaintiff contended she had not been a party to the first action, but the appellate court found that she was the real party in interest. The first action had been settled in a judgment entered on the settlement, and if this judgment were allowed to stand, there would be two contradictory judgments of the same court on the same issue. (Id. at pp. 323-324, 134 P.2d 56.) The [54 Cal.App.4th 557] appellate court ruled that the trial court's finding that plaintiff was not the real party in interest in the former action was contrary to the undisputed facts and, as there was no other support for the trial court's conclusion of law, the judgment was reversed. (Id. at pp. 327-328, 134 P.2d 56.)