How does the law of inference of identity work when there are similarities between an uncharged and charged crime?

The inference that the person who committed the uncharged offenses also committed the charged offenses cannot be solely supported by similarities so common that such similarities would be shared by other crimes committed by persons other than the defendant. (People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 244-250.) However, the inference "need not depend upon one or more unique or nearly unique features common to the charged and uncharged offenses, for features of substantial but lesser distinctiveness, although insufficient to raise the inference if considered separately, may yield a distinctive combination if considered together. Thus it may be said that the inference of identity arises when the marks common to the charged and uncharged offenses, considered singly or in combination, logically operate to set the charged and uncharged offenses apart from other crimes of the same general variety and, in so doing, tend to suggest that the perpetrator of the uncharged offenses was the perpetrator of the charged offenses." (Id. at p. 246, fn. omitted.)