Does the term "shall" in the Criminal Code apply to a prisoner's due process right to receive a copy of the disciplinary charge?

As discussed above, the requirements of Due Process are not inflexible, but they vary depending on the " 'nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.' [Citations.]" (Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 560, 94 S.Ct. at p. 2977.) It is evident on its face that this statute codifies a prisoner's due process right to receive adequate notice of the disciplinary charges. As such, it is subject to the balancing of considerations that the due process clause demands. In other words, the implementation of the statute is subject to the legitimate administrative and security needs of the institution. With this in mind, we conclude that the use of the mandatory term "shall" in the statute does not, itself, create a right in the prisoner to receive all information of the charge, confidential as well as nonconfidential. This was the holding in the similar case of Sandin v. Conner, supra, 515 U.S. at page ----, 115 S.Ct. at page 2300.