How have courts interpreted "the people's right to due process" not to include the right to compel the press to supply unpublished information obtained in the newsgathering process?

Thus, there is nothing illogical in interpreting "the people[`s] ... right to due process" not to include the right to compel the press through the sanctions of contempt incarceration and substantial fines to supply unpublished information obtained in the newsgathering process. The fact that the assertion of this immunity might lead to the inability of the prosecution to gain access to all the evidence it desires does not mean that a prosecutor's right to due process is violated, any more than the assertion of established evidentiary privileges against the prosecution would be a violation. (See Jones v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 56, 60-61, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919 [prosecutorial discovery limited by privilege against self-incrimination and attorney-client privilege]; Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 369, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304 [suggesting the same under Proposition 115's reciprocal discovery provisions].)