Does the term "in the immediate view and presence of the court" mean in front of the trial judge's person?

The trial court misunderstood the statutory language "in the immediate view and presence of the court" to mean in front of the trial judge's personle tribunal, c'est moi. To the contrary, the trial judge's presence at the contempt is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify summary contempt proceedings. The trial judge need not be present for the contempt to be direct so long as it is " 'committed in the presence of any one of the constituent parts of the court . . . .' " (Lapique v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1924) 68 Cal.App. 407, 413.) Conversely, even if the trial judge is present in the courtroom, the contempt is not direct if the court is not in session. (Id. at p. 415.) The trial judge "is a constituent part of the organization, but he is not the court. . . . The court is the totality of the constituent parts. It consists of the entire judicial organization for the trial of causes, and it is immediately present whenever and wherever, from the opening to the adjournment of the sitting, these constituent parts are actually performing their appropriate functions. [Fn. omitted.]" (Mosk, Direct Contempt (1956) 31 J. State Bar of Cal. 510, 514, italics added.)

The current statutory language suggests as much.⁵ It allows for summary proceedings when the contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of either "the court" or "the judge at chambers." ( 1211, subd. (a).) If we were to treat "judge" and "court" interchangeably in this context, then any contemptuous act committed in front of the judge would be a direct contempt and the statutory reference to "the judge at chambers" would be superfluous. Wherever possible, we avoid constructions that render particular statutory provisions

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superfluous or unnecessary. (City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 707, 724.)