Does the prosecutor's statement about provocation and heat of passion in a murder trial have been prejudicial?

We conclude, however, this statement was not prejudicial. The prosecutor's other statements about provocation and heat of passion were accurate and to the extent the jury was confused, it was properly instructed by the court. The court instructed the jury that "defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion if the defendant was provoked. As a result of the provocation the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment. And the provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than judgment." The court further explained that it is not enough that the defendant was provoked. "The defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of conduct. In deciding whether provocation is sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition in the same situation and knowing the same facts would have reacted from passion rather than judgment." We presume that the jury followed those instructions. (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 436.)