Does the mere happening of a motor vehicle constitute an inference of negligence?

However, so subtle a distinction in instruction on the mere happening of an accident does not change the rule enunciated by the above cited cases. To say that the happening of an accident does not prove negligence, is not drastically different from saying that it does not create an inference ⁴ of negligence. This is not a distinction likely to be appreciated by a jury (or, without careful analysis, by lawyers or judges). Since the effect of the two instructions is so similar, we think the instruction on 'mere happening' should not have been given in this case. The following statement from Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1958) 50 Cal.2d 153 at page 156, 323 P.2d 391 at page 392 is particularly applicable: 'Although it is proper in many cases to give an instruction that the mere happening of an accident does not support an inference of negligence, a problem arises where, as here, there is evidence warranting the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It is apparent that an instruction like the one quoted above ⁵ contains an idea which might be understood by a layman to be inconsistent with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. [Citations.] The direction that the mere happening of an accident, considered alone, does not support an inference of negligence would appear to contradict the usual statement of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as found in the typical instructions given on the subject, * * *.'