Does the felony-murder rule exist as an implication or an artificial concept not dependent upon malice?

Whether viewed as invoking as an implication naturally flowing from the nature of the underlying felony or as an artificial concept not dependent upon malice, the felony-murder rule is a rule of substantive law rather than an evidentiary aid in finding malice. (People v. Stamp (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 210, 82 Cal.Rptr. 598.) A presumption is such an evidentiary tool; that is, in the case of presumption, the law requires that one fact be assumed from the existence of another fact. (Evid.Code, 600, subd. (a).) In whatever manner we view the felony-murder rule under existing authority, the trier of fact is not required to assume malice from the existence of the underlying felony; it is not required to find malice at all. First degree felony-murder exists upon a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit a certain enumerated felony and in the course thereof, he or an accomplice killed someone; hence, the prosecution is not relieved of any particle of its burden of proof and there is no denial of due process.