Does the Attorney General have any grounds to argue that the imposition of the upper term of a sentence for assault was an abuse of power?

Santiago argues that the imposition of the upper term was an abuse of discretion for two reasons: (1) the trial court was unaware of Santiago's cognitive limitations as a mitigating factor and as a possible explanation for remarks the court interpreted as "callousness," and (2) the trial court treated as aggravating factors certain circumstances that were inherent in the crime itself, such as the victim's vulnerability and the threat of great bodily injury. The Attorney General is correct that Santiago forfeited these arguments by failing to object when his sentence was imposed. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.) However, because Santiago also alleges trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for having failed to make these arguments in the trial court, we will address them here on the merits.