Does section 654 of the California Criminal Code bar prosecution for the robbery charged in count 2 of the information in the Information Protection Act?

5 Petitioners also contended that prosecution for the robbery charged in count 2 of the information was barred by section 654 on the ground that they had already been convicted in Alameda County for receiving the very stolen property ( 496) as that taken from the victim as charged in Santa Clara County in count 2. Section 654 provides in part that 'an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either (of different ways in which an act or omission may be punished) bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.' (See People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 760, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449; People v. Tatum (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 179, 186, 25 Cal.Rptr. 832.) The court agreed with petitioners' contention and dismissed the robbery charge set out in count 2. That order of dismissal is now final.

6 In addition to looking to statutory provisions in interpreting the California constitutional provision, we also held there was 'an even more compelling reason than their parallel interpretations for giving similar meanings to our constitutional and statutory provisions.' (Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 83, 92, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 792, 507 P.2d 90, 96.) That reason was the mandate of equal protection which required the parallel resolution of a speedy trial violation in a situation which, although not specifically provided for by statute, could not be distinguished on reasonable grounds from a situation specifically provided for by statute. (Id.)