Does a defendant have a right to self-representation against the death penalty?

Although it is true, as defendant argues, that defendant has no right to waive his automatic appeal from a death judgment (People v. Massie (1985) [4 Cal.4th 1063] 40 Cal.3d 620, 624, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309), or otherwise seek the state's assistance in committing suicide, it does not follow that a defendant's right of self-representation should be circumscribed as he suggests at the penalty trial. We have consistently held that the failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty trial does not make the proceeding unreliable in constitutional terms. (People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 566, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d

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Defendant argues that the public policy of the state against state-assisted suicide requires reversal of any death judgment entered after the defendant refuses to put on a case in mitigation and seeks the death penalty. However, we have rejected the claim that a court necessarily abuses its discretion in granting a motion for self-representation when the stated purpose of the motion is to obtain a verdict of death, despite the fundamental public policy against state-assisted suicide. (People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1220-1223, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) The Sixth Amendment teaches that we should accord the competent defendant, even in a capital case, this much control over his destiny. (Id. at pp. 1222-1223, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) ¹⁴

Nor have we been convinced that self-representation under the circumstances defendant describes violates public policy. "First, defendant's proposed strategy by no means ensured the return of a death verdict.... [A] jury might well conclude that death was 'too good' for the defendant.... Second, if the trier of penalty has determined death to be the appropriate punishment, and the death judgment meets constitutional standards of reliability, the judgment cannot reasonably be regarded as the defendant's doing [4 Cal.4th 1064] (other than by his commission of the capital crimes) or its execution as suicide. Finally ... defendant's argument would effectively preclude death penalty prosecution of self-represented capital defendants who decline to present mitigating evidence, as there is no effective means to compel a pro se defendant to make an affirmative penalty defense." (People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1223, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.)