How has DNA evidence been interpreted in the context of changes to the Criminal Code since the date of trial?

R. v. Good, to which I have referred above in relation to DNA evidence (and which was applied in Engum v. HMTQ, 2002 BCSC 156), is an example. Changes to the Criminal Code that were introduced between the offence date and the date of trial furnished the Crown with an entitlement to obtain DNA evidence that could not have been compelled from the accused earlier. The fact that this placed the accused in greater jeopardy and “enhanced the case against [him]” did not lead Hall J. (as he then was) to rule that the DNA amendments could not be applied retrospectively. His Lordship saw no vested right in the accused to preserve his entitlement to refuse to provide samples of his DNA. The amendments compelling the furnishing, by the accused, of a sample of his DNA were held to be evidentiary and procedural and, thus, properly subject to retrospective application.