Can provocation reduce a killing to second degree murder?

CALCRIM No. 570, pertaining solely to voluntary manslaughter, properly specifies provocation in that context must be objectively reasonable, in other words, that "a person of average disposition" would have been provoked "in the same situation and knowing the same facts." Read with CALCRIM No. 522, which does not contain any such requirements for provocation reducing a killing to second degree murder, the only reasonable conclusion to be reached is that the provocation precluding a finding of premeditation is something different from (and less than) that which would preclude a finding of malice. That is, the jury necessarily understood that if some provocation exists, the killing must be second degree murder unless it finds the provocation was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Otherwise, there would be no need to separately instruct the jury to consider provocation in the context of second degree murder as distinct from the provocation that will reduce a killing to voluntary manslaughter. Considering the instructions as a whole, a reasonable juror would have understood that something less than objectively reasonable provocation could preclude a finding of premeditation and justify a verdict of second degree murder. (See People v. Scott (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1095 ["[j]urors are presumed able to understand and correlate instructions and are further presumed to have followed the court's instructions"].)