Can a police officer conduct an "accelerated booking search" after the booking process has ended?

In short, just as the legitimate purposes of the booking search exception do not justify a belated search conducted after the booking process has ended (People v. Smith (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 840, 845, 163 Cal.Rptr. 322), so also they do not justify a premature search performed before that process has begun.

Finally, we cannot blind ourselves to the practical dangers inherent in the "accelerated booking search" theory. Both of the above-mentioned intrusions permissible at the time of a lawful arrest--a search incident to the arrest and a patdown in the event of transportation--are restricted in their scope and tailored to their particular justifications. By contrast, as noted above an "accelerated booking search" would have no such restrictions. ⁹ If such an exception were recognized, police officers would have a license to conduct an immediate "thorough search of the booking type" of the person and effects of any individual they arrest without a warrant for a minor but bookable offense, in the hope of discovering evidence of a more serious crime; if such evidence were found, the suspect would then be [34 Cal.3d 728] booked instead on the latter charge and the intrusion would be rationalized after the fact as an "accelerated booking search." A comparison between the initial arrest and the ultimate charge in the case at bar illustrates the point. As recently said in a related context, "Since this significant risk of intrusion is not counterbalanced by an equivalent police necessity it cannot be tolerated." (People v. Mosqueda (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 918, 924, 180 Cal.Rptr. 591.)