California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502 (Cal. App. 1986):
In a jury trial, under Penal Code section 1118.1, a defense motion for acquittal at the close of the prosecution case could be granted only if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on appeal. 1 The trial judge does not weigh the credibility of the prosecution evidence, for that would invade the province of the jury which is the trier of fact. (See People v. Wong (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 812, 827, 828, 111 Cal.Rptr. 314.) In a court trial, on the other hand, for reasons of judicial economy Penal Code section 1118 permits the trial judge to grant a defense motion for acquittal at the close of the prosecution case "if the court, upon weighing the evidence then before it, finds the defendant not guilty of such offense or offenses." 2 Appellant argues, "A defendant in a court trial gains the benefit of having the trier of fact evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and of having the case against him proved beyond a reasonable doubt before he is required to put on a defense. Thus, if the prosecution has not proved its case at that point, the defendant need not worry about proving up
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[180 Cal.App.3d 184] Although this distinction exists, it is a reasonable accommodation between judicial efficiency and preservation of the fact finding function of the jury in a case where one of the parties has demanded a jury trial. There is no merit to appellant's contention that this distinction invades any fundamental rights of the defendant so as to require "strict scrutiny" for purposes of equal protection analysis and a "compelling" justification by the People. (Citing Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 597, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241.) Appellant never successfully identifies a fundamental right which is violated by the statutory distinction. The basic difference between the two statutes is that in a court trial the defendant gets a peek at the tentative thinking of the trier of fact before he puts on a defense. While this might be the fulfillment of a defense attorney's fondest dreams, it is hardly a fundamental right. It bears no resemblance to the fundamental rights directly affected in cases cited by appellant. 3 Appellant's assertion that his "right to present a defense as well as his right to testify were significantly diminished" is simply without foundation. The statutes are identical in preserving the defendant's right to present evidence. (See fns. 1, 2, ante.) Appellant and his counsel had full opportunity to hear and evaluate all the evidence before presenting whatever defense they wished. Appellant was not subjected to different standards of proof, as intimated by his citation of cases involving civil commitment. Whether by court trial or jury trial, appellant could not be convicted except by evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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