Can a defendant be convicted of concealing and/or receiving stolen property?

Several cases are of interest to us in our analysis. Williams v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 330, 146 Cal.Rptr. 311, considered the case of a defendant charged with one count of receiving and concealing stolen property, and another count of conspiracy to commit receiving and concealing stolen property. The court held that under the facts of that case the statute of limitations barred the "receiving" offense but did not bar the "concealing" charge, the latter being a continuing offense. In so holding the court noted that "(c)oncealing stolen property is a distinct and separate offense from receiving stolen property precisely because

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In People v. Feldman (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 15, 339 P.2d 888, the defendant was indicted on a charge of "receiving" stolen property. The evidence showed only that defendant concealed or aided in concealing the stolen property. The court held that the conviction must be reversed because defendant was not properly apprised in advance of the specific charge, stating: "Concealing or aiding in concealing the stolen property is manifestly not the same offense as receiving or aiding in receiving stolen property." (Id., at p. 24, 339 P.2d at p. 8014.)

In another case the court was confronted with a witness who had received the stolen property and testified to his sale of the property to the defendant who was himself on trial for receiving stolen property. (People v. Burness (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 214, 127 P.2d 623.) The court held that the witness was not defendant's accomplice under the evidence presented, noting that by purchasing and receiving the property from the witness, "the defendant became guilty of an offense separate and distinct" from that committed by the witness in receiving it from the original thief. (Id., at p. 218, 127 P.2d at p. 625.)

It is settled law in California that, absent a preexisting conspiracy, a thief and a receiver of stolen property are not accomplices. (People v. Lima (1944) 25 Cal.2d 573, 154 P.2d 698.)

[110 Cal.App.3d 734] The court in Lima explained the reason behind the rule: