Can a defendant argue that forcible sexual penetration is a general intent crime?

Citing People v. White (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193 (White), defendant contends section 289 is a specific intent crime. In White, the court instructed, "'That the penetration was done with the purpose and specific intent to cause sexual gratification, arousal or abuse.'" (White, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 204, italics added.) The reviewing court found no instructional error. (White, supra, at p. 206.) In People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, at page 776, the appellate court stated, "The only specific intent involved in foreign object penetration is 'the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.' ( 289, subd. (a).)"

In contrast, the People cite to People v. Dillon (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1380, where the parties agreed that "forcible sexual penetration is a general intent crime."

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