Can a judge be found to be bias on a second appeal?

As discussed in Macy v. Macy (1984), 3 O.A.C. 369, this situation does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias: It must be conceded that her apprehension that she would be unsuccessful on her husband’s second appeal in the event that the judge who heard the first appeal presided on the second appeal was a reasonable one. In my view, however, it was not a reasonable apprehension related to bias. I know of no authority which has gone so far as to say that the fact that a judge has previously applied or formulated in an action a principle of law which may be applicable to the factual situation in another action which he is scheduled to try, is sufficient to provide the basis for reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of one of the parties to the later action. I am satisfied that, standing alone, it cannot do so. To hold otherwise would mean that any litigant, who ascertained that a judge had previously relied on or formulated a principle of law which was adverse to the position of such litigant in a later case, would be entitled to insist upon such judge disqualifying himself on the grounds of a reasonable apprehension of bias. It would be an indirect way to assert a right to “pick one’s judge.” A litigant has the right to have a fair and impartial judge, not a favourable judge. There must not be raised in the mind of a litigant any reasonable apprehension of bias as distinct from any reasonable apprehension of lack of success.