MEMO TO:
Alexsei Demo US
RESEARCH ID:
#40007300a26a63
JURISDICTION:
State
STATE/FORUM:
California, United States of America
ANSWERED ON:
May 19, 2022
CLASSIFICATION:
Professions and occupations
Civil practice and procedure

Issue:

Do attorneys have standing to appeal court orders in their personal capacity?

Conclusion:

A party is considered legally aggrieved only if their rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment and these rights or interests must be immediate, pecuniary, substantial, and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment. (County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal.3d 730, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1971), Bratcher v. Buckner, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 534, 90 Cal.App.4th 1177 (Cal. App. 2001), In re Charlisse C., 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 173, 149 Cal.App.4th 1554 (Cal. App. 2007), CONKLE & OLESTEN v. GOODRICH, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10018 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. November 1, 2006), Marriage of Tushinsky, In re, 249 Cal.Rptr. 611, 203 Cal.App.3d 136 (Cal. App. 1988), Twentieth Century Ins. v. Choong, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 79 Cal.App.4th 1274 (Cal. App. 2000))

A party may not take an appeal based upon an error that injuriously affects only a nonappealing third party. (Bratcher v. Buckner, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 534, 90 Cal.App.4th 1177 (Cal. App. 2001))

In Twentieth Century Ins. v. Choong, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 79 Cal.App.4th 1274 (Cal. App. 2000), the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that an attorney employer had standing to appeal a sanctions order imposed on one of their employee attorneys. The Court found that the appellant was an aggrieved party under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 902 because he was obligated under the Labor Code to reimburse the employee attorney for the sanction if it was upheld on appeal; thus the appellant's rights or interests were injuriously affected by the sanction order and his interest was immediate, pecuniary, and substantial.

In Marriage of Tushinsky, In re, 249 Cal.Rptr. 611, 203 Cal.App.3d 136 (Cal. App. 1988), the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that two attorneys did not have standing to appeal an order denying their request for attorney's fees and their request for imposition of an attorney's lien for services rendered on behalf one of the parties because the attorneys were not aggrieved parties as required by Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 902. The right to attorney's fees and costs under Cal. Civ. Code § 4370 belongs to the client spouse and accrues to the benefit of the attorney only indirectly. Moreover, the right to such fees and costs belongs to the spouse to whom they were awarded, not to the attorney, even if the award is made directly payable to the attorney. Additionally, a judgment purporting to rule on an attorney's "Notice of Attorney's Lien" filed in the underlying action does not injuriously affect the attorney's rights or interests as the notice has no legal import with respect to the adjudication of the attorney's claim for fees and costs from their client.

Law:

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 902 sets out who has standing to appeal an order:

Any party aggrieved may appeal in the cases prescribed in this title. A party appealing is known as an appellant, and an adverse party as a respondent.

In County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal.3d 730, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1971), the Supreme Court of California explained that, pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 902, any aggrieved party may appeal from an adverse judgment. One is considered to be aggrieved if their rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment. An appellant's interest must be immediate, pecuniary, substantial, and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment (at 736-737):

' Any aggrieved party' may appeal from an adverse judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 902.) It is generally held, however, that only parties of record may appeal; consequently one who is denied the right to intervene in an action ordinarily may not appeal from a judgment subsequently entered in the case. (Braun v. Brown, 13 Cal.2d 130, 133--134, 87 P.2d 1009; In re Veterans' Industries, Inc., 8 Cal.App.3d 902, 916, 88 Cal.Rptr. 303.) Instead, he may appeal from the order denying intervention. (Id.) 4 Nevertheless, one who is legally 'aggrieved' by a judgment may become a party of record and obtain a right to appeal by moving to vacate the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 663. (Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co., 20 Cal.2d 199, 201, 124 P.2d 815; Elliott v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. 501, 509, 77 P. 1109; Estate of Partridge, 261 Cal.App.2d 58, 60--63, 67 Cal.Rptr. 433; Butterfield v. Tietz, 247 Cal.App.2d 483, 484--485, 55 Cal.Rptr. 577; Estate of Sloan, 222 Cal.App.2d[5 Cal.3d 737] 283, 291--292, 35 Cal.Rptr. 167.) One is considered 'aggrieved' whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment. (Elliott v. Superior Court, Supra,144 Cal. at p. 509, 77 P. 1109; see Leoke v. County of San Bernardino, 249 Cal.App.2d 767, 770--771, 57 Cal.Rptr. 770; Buffington v. Ohmert, 253 Cal.App.2d 254, 255, 61 Cal.Rptr. 360.) Appellant's interest 'must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment.' (See Leoke v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 771, 57 Cal.Rptr. at p. 772.)

In Bratcher v. Buckner, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 534, 90 Cal.App.4th 1177 (Cal. App. 2001), the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District reiterated that, pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 902, a party may not take an appeal based upon an error that injuriously affects only a nonappealing third party (at 1184):

Parties have standing to appeal only if legally "aggrieved" by the judgment or order appealed from. (902.) A party is considered legally aggrieved such that he or she has standing to appeal only if his or her "rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment." (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737.) Further, the rights or interests injuriously affected must be "'"immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment."'" (Ibid.) Thus, a party may not take an appeal based upon an error that injuriously affects only a nonappealing third party. (Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1128.)

In Twentieth Century Ins. v. Choong, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 79 Cal.App.4th 1274 (Cal. App. 2000), the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that an attorney employer had standing to appeal a sanction order imposed on one of their employee attorneys. The Court noted that a sanction order is appealable, but normally it must be appealed by the attorney who was sanctioned. In this case, the appellant argued that because the Labor Code required him and his firm to reimburse the employee attorney for the amount of the sanction, he had standing to appeal the sanction order. The Court agreed and found that because the appellant was obligated to reimburse the employee attorney for the sanction if it was upheld on appeal, the appellant's rights or interests were injuriously affected by the sanction order and his interest was immediate, pecuniary, and substantial. Therefore, the appellant qualified as an aggrieved party under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 902 and had standing to appeal the sanction order (at 1276-1277):

As previously noted, the monetary sanctions in this case were imposed on attorney Richard Collins, not on attorney Joel Drum, the appellant. Although a sanction order against an attorney is appealable (see Code Civ. Proc., 904.1, subd. (b); Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 970, 976), normally it must be appealed by the attorney sanctioned. (Calhoun v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 39, 42.) Drum points out, however, when Collins was sanctioned he was an employee of Drum and Drum's law firm and was representing plaintiff 20th Century in the course and scope of his employment. Therefore, according to Drum, he and his firm are required by Labor Code section 2802 to reimburse Collins for the amount of the sanction and this gives Drum standing to appeal the sanction order. We agree.

Section 2802 of the Labor Code provides in relevant part: "An employer shall indemnify his employee for all that the employee necessarily expends or loses in direct consequence of the discharge of his duties . . . ." Section 902 of the Code of Civil Procedure states: "Any party aggrieved may appeal . . . ." An "aggrieved" party is one "whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment" and whose interest in the matter is "'immediate, pecuniary, and substantial'" as opposed to "'nominal [or] remote'." (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737.) Because Drum is obligated to reimburse Collins for the sanction if it is upheld on appeal, Drum's "rights or interests are injuriously affected" by the sanction order and his interest is "immediate, pecuniary and substantial."

In addition, denying an attorney-employer standing to appeal a sanction award against one of his employees would be fundamentally unfair because if the employee fails to appeal, and under Labor Code section 2802 he has no incentive to do so, the employer would be bound to pay the sanction without any opportunity to contest its legality.

For these reasons, we conclude Drum has standing to prosecute the appeal of the sanction order against Collins.

In Marriage of Tushinsky, In re, 249 Cal.Rptr. 611, 203 Cal.App.3d 136 (Cal. App. 1988), the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that two attorneys did not have standing to appeal an order denying their request for attorney's fees and their request for imposition of an attorney's lien for services rendered on behalf one of the parties because the attorneys were not aggrieved parties as required by Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 902. The Court explained that the right to attorney's fees and costs under Cal. Civ. Code § 4370 belongs to the client spouse and accrues to the benefit of the attorney only indirectly. Moreover, the right to such fees and costs belongs to the spouse to whom they were awarded, not to the attorney, even if the award is made directly payable to the attorney. Thus, an attorney is not a party aggrieved within the meaning of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 902 with respect to a ruling on a request for attorney's fees under Cal. Civ. Code § 4370 that is encompassed in a final judgment in a dissolution proceeding (at 141-142):

There is no question that the subject judgment is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a).) However, only a "party aggrieved may appeal" from a judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902.) As a general rule, [203 Cal.App.3d 142] only parties of record may appeal. (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 736, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953.) It is undisputed that neither Marks nor Stevenson individually, nor Marks & Stevenson, are parties to the dissolution action. Accordingly, they are not "parties aggrieved" who are entitled to appeal from the judgment unless some exception applies. From our review of the applicable law we conclude no such exception exists.

"One is considered 'aggrieved' whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment. [Citations.] Appellant's interest ' "must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment." ' [Citation.]" (County of Alameda v. Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d 730, 737, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953.)

It is well settled that the right to attorney's fees and costs under Civil Code section 4370 belongs to the client spouse and accrues to the benefit of the attorney only indirectly. Moreover, the right to such fees and costs belongs to the spouse to whom they were awarded, not to the attorney, even if the award is made directly payable to the attorney. (Meadow v. Superior Court (1963) 59 Cal.2d 610, 615-616, 30 Cal.Rptr. 824, 381 P.2d 648; Marshank v. Superior Court (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 602, 605-608, 4 Cal.Rptr. 593; Wong v. Superior Court (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 541, 545, 546, 54 Cal.Rptr. 782.) The right of an attorney to recover attorney's fees cannot be invoked in the dissolution action itself. Instead, the attorney must institute an independent action against the client to recover attorney's fees on his or her own behalf. (Meadow v. Superior Court, supra, 59 Cal.2d 610, 616, 30 Cal.Rptr. 824, 381 P.2d 648; Marshank v. Superior Court, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 602, 608, 4 Cal.Rptr. 593.)

Based on the foregoing we hold that an attorney is not a party aggrieved within the meaning of section 902 of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to a ruling on a request for attorney's fees under Civil Code section 4370 which is encompassed in a final judgment in a dissolution proceeding. 3

Page 615

3 (See also, Telander v. Telander (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 207, 140 Cal.Rptr. 204, regarding dismissal of appeal by attorney from an order denying an award of attorney's fees in a separate maintenance action on the ground he was not an aggrieved party since he had no interest in the subject matter of the action.)

The Court also held that an attorney is not aggrieved within the meaning of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 902 with regard to a judgment purporting to rule on the attorney's "Notice of Attorney's Lien" filed in the underlying action to which the attorney is not a party. The attorney's rights or interests are not injuriously affected by the judgment and the notice has no legal import with respect to the adjudication of the attorney's claim for fees and costs from his client (at 143):

We further hold an attorney is not a "party aggrieved" within the meaning of section 902 of the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to a judgment purporting to rule on the attorney's "Notice of Attorney's Lien" filed in the underlying action to which the attorney is not a party. The attorney is not made a party of record because of the fact that such notice was filed.

Moreover, the attorney's "rights or interests are [not] injuriously affected by the judgment." (County of Alameda v. Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d 730, 737, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953.) The notice has no legal import with respect to adjudication of the attorney's claim for fees and costs from his client, who is a party to that action. It is established that such "[c]ompensation must be sought in an independent action by the attorney against the client, and not by application to the court in which the litigation is pending. [Citations.]" (Hendricks v. Superior Court (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 586, 589, 17 Cal.Rptr. 364.)

Inasmuch as we find that Marks & Stevenson have no right, or standing, to appeal from the judgment, we have no jurisdiction to consider their appeal and do not reach the contentions which they raise and must, instead, dismiss the purported appeal.

In Life v. County of Los Angeles, 218 Cal.App.3d 1287, 267 Cal.Rptr. 557 (Cal. App. 1990), the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging medical negligence by one defendant, the County, and legal malpractice by a second defendant, an attorney. The legal malpractice claim was based on the attorney's failure to file a timely government tort claim. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County which argued that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff had not timely filed a claim as required by the Government Code and could not obtain relief from the claims statute. The attorney-defendant filed a notice of appeal from this judgment (at 1291): 

On April 25, 1985, Life filed a complaint alleging medical negligence by the County and legal malpractice by Zuzga. 2 Life

Page 559

filed a first amended complaint on August 7, 1985, pleading two causes of action. The pleading did not name the other driver as a defendant. In the first cause of action directed against the County, Life alleged medical malpractice. In the second cause of action, against Zuzga, Life alleged legal malpractice based on Zuzga's failure to file a timely government tort claim.

On January 23, 1989, the County filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds: the undisputed evidence demonstrated that Life had not filed a claim with the County Board of Supervisors within 100 days of the accrual of his cause of action as required by Government Code sections 911.2 and 915; the County was not estopped to assert the claims statute; and, Life could not obtain relief from the claims statute.

Life's new counsel filed papers opposing the County's motion. Zuzga, who also had retained counsel, likewise opposed the County's motion. The County's reply to the opposition papers did not challenge Zuzga's standing to oppose its motion and addressed the merits of her contentions.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County on Life's complaint, and judgment was entered on April 3, 1989. On April 4, 1989, the County served notice of entry of judgment on Life and Zuzga.

Fifty-nine days later, on June 2, 1989, Zuzga filed notice of appeal from the judgment in favor of the County as against Life. Eleven days later, on June 13, 1989, Life filed notice of cross-appeal.

The attorney-defendant argued that she was aggrieved by the judgment because it would constitute res judicata in the plaintiff's malpractice action against her. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District disagreed and found that because the summary judgment did not dispose of the attorney-defendant's potential defenses to the legal malpractice claim, the summary judgment did not lead to the inequity of the attorney-defendant being wholly bound by that decision without any right of review. Thus, the attorney-defendant did not have standing to appeal the judgment (at 1294-1295):

Zuzga maintains she is aggrieved by the judgment because it will constitute res judicata in Life's legal malpractice action against her. The contention is unpersuasive.

Legal malpractice involves issues different from those raised on the County's motion

Page 561

for summary judgment. Accordingly, the first judgment would not be a complete bar but at most a collateral estoppel as to certain issues. (See 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, § 189, p. 623.) While the judgment bars Life's medical malpractice action against the County for want of a timely claim, the judgment makes no determination, for example, as to whether Zuzga's conduct fell below the applicable standard of care, or whether Life had a meritorious claim against the County which he lost by reason of Zuzga's alleged negligence. (See Budd v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d 195, 200, 98 Cal.Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433; John B. Gunn Law Corp. v. Maynard (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1565, 1569, 235 Cal.Rptr. 180.)

Because the summary judgment on the government tort claim issue was not determinative of Zuzga's defenses in the legal malpractice action, Salinero v. Pon (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 120, 177 Cal.Rptr. 204, is unavailing. In Salinero, a window washer sued the owners of an apartment building for injuries sustained while cleaning the windows. The owners filed a cross-complaint against the architect. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the architect on the owners' cross-complaint on the ground the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The trial court also granted nonsuit in favor of the owners on the plaintiff's complaint. (Id., at pp. 126-127, 177 Cal.Rptr. 204.)

The plaintiff appealed, arguing, inter alia, the applicable statute of limitations was unconstitutional because it arbitrarily granted a special privilege to a class of persons--architects and construction contractors. (Salinero, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 127, 177 Cal.Rptr. 204.) The architect contended the plaintiff lacked standing to assert the unconstitutionality of the statute, since he, the [218 Cal.App.3d 1295] architect, was made a party to the action by the owners' cross-complaint, not by the plaintiff's complaint and thus, the plaintiff was not aggrieved by the summary judgment dismissing the architect. (Ibid.)

Salinero rejected the architect's argument that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert the unconstitutionality of the statute. It observed that at least before summary judgment was granted, the plaintiff retained the option of substituting the architect for a Doe defendant by amendment of the complaint. Further, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the architect on the statute of limitations issue adversely affected the plaintiff's right to pursue his action against the architect, given the application of res judicata or collateral estoppel principles to bar any subsequent action by the plaintiff against the architect. (Salinero, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at pp. 127-128, 177 Cal.Rptr. 204.) For those reasons, if prohibited from proceeding further, the plaintiff would suffer the inequity of being bound by the decision without any right of review. (Id., at p. 128, 177 Cal.Rptr. 204.)

Here, because the summary judgment did not dispose of Zuzga's potential defenses to the legal malpractice claim, the summary judgment in favor of the County does not lead to the inequity of Zuzga's being wholly bound by that decision without any right of review. (See Salinero, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 128, 177 Cal.Rptr. 204.) Therefore, we reject Zuzga's argument that she has standing to appeal because of the res judicata effect of the summary judgment.

Although not citable because the decision was later superseded by Grant of Review, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District's discussion of standing in In re Charlisse C., 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 173, 149 Cal.App.4th 1554 (Cal. App. 2007) may be instructive. The Court held that a nonprofit law office that represented parties in the Los Angeles County Juvenile Dependency Court had standing to appeal the juvenile court's disqualification order. The Court found that the nonprofit law office was an aggrieved party within the meaning of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 902 because it had a substantially immediate and concrete stake in the present litigation and its interest was not nominal or remote. Further, because of the ongoing contractual obligations the nonprofit law office owed to the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Center had a sufficient interest to pursue its position (at 182-183):

Mother contends that the Center lacks standing to appeal the disqualification order. Child, now represented on appeal by independent counsel assigned by the California Appellate Project, joins in mother's standing contention. The standing issue arises because neither mother; child; nor the Center's Unit 3J which was the attorney of record in the juvenile court, sought appellate review of the disqualification order. Mother argues that the Center is an umbrella entity that is neither an "aggrieved" party nor the attorney that was actually disqualified.

A party has standing to seek review of a judgment or order by demonstrating that the party is legally aggrieved within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 902. (Crook v. Contreras (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1201, 116 Cal.

[58 Cal.Rptr.3d 183]

Rptr.2d 319; Bratcher v. Buckner (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1184, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 534.) "One is considered, `aggrieved' whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment. [Citations.] Appellant's interest `"must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment.'" [Citation.]" (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953; accordUnited Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1304-1305, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 387.) "`[A] party must be "beneficially interested" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086), i.e., have "some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large." [Citation.] This standard ... is equivalent to the federal "injury in fact" test, which requires a party to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it has suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest that is `(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' " [Citation.]' (Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 361-362[, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 981 P.2d 499].)" (Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Helliker (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1182, 42 Cal. Rptr.3d 191; see Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 796, 166 Cal.Rptr. 844, 614 P.2d 276 [to show beneficial interest party must show "some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large"].) "The purpose of a standing requirement is to ensure that the courts will decide only actual controversies between parties with a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute to press their case with vigor. [Citations.]" (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 439, 261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610; Holmes v. California Nat. Guard (2001) 90 Cal. App.4th 297, 314-315, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 154.)

Since 1990, the Center and its predecessor organization, DCLS, have provided legal representation to children and other litigants in dependency litigation in Los Angeles County. The Center is contractually obligated to the Administrative Office of the Courts to provide conflict-free representation to children in dependency litigation. The Center has a substantially immediate and concrete stake in the present litigation. The Center's interest is not nominal or remote. Further, because of the on-going contractual obligations owed to the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Center has a sufficient interest to pursue its position. The Center meets the tests for standing to appeal. (Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 361-362, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 981 P.2d 499; Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 796, 166 Cal. Rptr. 844, 614 P.2d 276; County of Alameda v. Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 737, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953.)

In the unpublished case of CONKLE & OLESTEN v. GOODRICH, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10018 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. November 1, 2006), the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District explained that the test for aggrievement is whether a person's rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment. The Court noted that in another case the Supreme Court of California found that the beneficial interest standard in California is equivalent to the federal injury-in-fact test. Thus, the Court reasoned that the Supreme Court of California construed the test for aggrievement to be an injury-in-fact test (at 16-17):

However, the June 8 appeals aren't out of the woods yet. To have standing to appeal, a party must be aggrieved within the meaning of section 902. (E.g.Bratcher v. Buckner (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1184 ["Parties have standing to appeal only if legally 'aggrieved' by the judgment or order appealed from."]; Crook v. Contreras (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1201 ["Contreras lacks standing to appeal the trial court's order determining that Crook's actions were not 'contests' because he cannot establish that he is aggrieved by this order."].)

The test for aggrievement is whether a person's rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment (see County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737, 97 Cal. Rptr. 385), which has more recently been construed by our Supreme Court to be an injury-in-fact test (see Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 362 [beneficial [*17]  interest in California "is equivalent to the federal 'injury in fact' test, which requires a party to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it has suffered 'an invasion of a legally protected interest that is "(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."'"]).

Authorities:
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 902
County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal.3d 730, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1971)
Bratcher v. Buckner, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 534, 90 Cal.App.4th 1177 (Cal. App. 2001)
Twentieth Century Ins. v. Choong, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 79 Cal.App.4th 1274 (Cal. App. 2000)
Marriage of Tushinsky, In re, 249 Cal.Rptr. 611, 203 Cal.App.3d 136 (Cal. App. 1988)
Life v. County of Los Angeles, 218 Cal.App.3d 1287, 267 Cal.Rptr. 557 (Cal. App. 1990)
In re Charlisse C., 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 173, 149 Cal.App.4th 1554 (Cal. App. 2007)
CONKLE & OLESTEN v. GOODRICH, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10018 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. November 1, 2006)