When will the joinder of a properly joined charge apply in a murder case?

The gang evidence - both in general and as it specifically related to each case - would have been cross-admissible in all three cases to show motive, intent, and knowledge, and, as between the murder and attempted murder cases, common scheme or plan. (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 130-131; and see People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 655-656 [gang evidence properly admitted to show motive; although, even where relevant, gang evidence may have highly inflammatory impact on jury, probative value of motive generally exceeds prejudicial effect].)

However, "[w]hile the presence of [cross-admissible] evidence ' "is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial court's refusal to sever properly joined charges" ' [citation], the absence of cross-admissible evidence does not bar joinder." (People v. O'Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 968.)

Assuming arguendo that the evidence underlying the joined charges would not be cross-admissible, we proceed to consider " 'whether the benefits of joinder were sufficiently substantial to outweigh the possible "spill-over" effect of the"'other-crime"' evidence on the jury in its consideration of the evidence of defendant's guilt of each set of offenses.' [Citations.]" (People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 775.) In making that assessment, we consider three additional factors, any of which - combined with our earlier determination of absence of cross-admissibility - might establish an abuse of the trial court's discretion: (1) whether some of the charges are particularly likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (2) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the totality of the evidence may alter the outcome as to some or all of the charges; or (3) whether one of the charges (but not another) is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case. (Ibid.)