California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from Baisden v. Bowers, F076662 (Cal. App. 2019):
running].) Additionally, we discern no ground of impossibility for filing an action in this case, and certainly nothing on par with what occurred in Lewis, during the considerable period of time after Baisden was convicted, or while he was incarcerated or on probation. It is instructive that the statutory disability relating to incarceration only applies to causes of action that accrue while the individual is imprisoned, and even then, the disability cannot exceed two years. ( 352.1, subd. (a).) Further, it is well established that a parolee may not assert his status as a parolee as a basis for equitable tolling. (Deutch v. Hoffman (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 152, 155.) We think a similar rule would apply to probationers such as Baisden, whether or not his request for a formal approval to sue people was allegedly denied. Nor has Baisden demonstrated that further amendment to include additional background allegations would indicate otherwise. Additionally, in light of the litigation privilege established in the anti-SLAPP motion, leave to amend would serve no purpose. For these reasons, we hold the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer on statute of limitations grounds, without leave to amend.
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