When will a court impute notice and knowledge of the conditions of a deported person's release from prison that they have committed a crime?

A court may impute notice and knowledge of conditions when their violation entails a criminal act. United States v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786, 790 (9th Cir.1991). Furthermore, the government has no obligation to warn deported persons of the precise penalties which might attach if they reenter the country or commit a crime. United States v. Arzante-Nunez, 18 F.3d 730, 737 (9th Cir.1994). Finally, when defendant was advised of the conditions of his supervised release, he had just been sentenced to prison for reentry after deportation. He is not in a credible position to argue that he did not know that another reentry would be a serious violation of the law.

Defendant's ambiguity argument also has no merit. The applicable statute, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1326, is not ambiguous. When a statute is not ambiguous, there is no need to "interpret" the language by resorting to extrinsic aids. United States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992, 995 (9th Cir.1993).

We have examined defendant's remaining arguments and determine them to be without merit. The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.