What is the test for time-barred amendments in medical malpractice cases?

Even if we were to consider the merits of the appeal, appellant would not prevail. On June 21, 2013, when appellant amended the second amended complaint to add respondent as a Doe defendant, the amendment was time-barred by section 340.5. This section "provides the limitations period for medical malpractice actions at the earlier of either three years from the date of injury or one year from when the plaintiff discovers his injury." (Barker v. Garza (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1469.) In his second amended complaint, appellant alleged that his mother had died on May 13, 2010, more than three years before the amendment of June 21, 2013. He also alleged that he had discovered his mother's injury "on or about November, 2010," more than one year before the amendment.

Section 474 does not shield appellant from the bar of the statute of limitations. Section 474 establishes an exception to the following general rule: " '[A]n amended complaint that adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed.' [Citation.]" (Hawkins v. Pacific Coast Bldg. Products, Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1503.) Section 474 "permits a plaintiff to amend complaints by adding parties as Doe defendants '[w]hen the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant' at the time the complaint is filed. 'The purpose of section 474 is to enable a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations when he [or she] is ignorant of the identity of the defendant.' [Citation.] . . . 'If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed. [Citation.]' " (Davis v. Marin (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 380, 386-387, fn. omitted.) As the trial court observed, section 474 is inapplicable because appellant was not ignorant of respondent's name when he filed the original complaint on August 12, 2011.