What is the test for substantial evidence in a criminal threat case?

"In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . , a trial court applies the same standard an appellate court applies in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, that is, ' "whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged." [Citations.]' [Citation.] 'Where the [Penal Code] section 1118.1 motion is made at the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the sufficiency of the evidence is tested as it stood at that point.' [Citation.]" (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212-1213.)

Substantial evidence is "evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuefrom which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1212.) "We review independently a trial court's ruling under [Penal Code] section 1118.1 that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction." (Id. at p. 1213.)

In People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221 (Toledo), the court "divide[d] the crime of criminal threat into five constituent elements . . . ." (Id. at p. 227.) The prosecution must establish "all of the following: (1) that the defendant 'willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person,' (2) that the defendant made the threat ' with the specific intent that the statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out,' (3) that the threat--which may be 'made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device'--was 'on its face and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat,' (4) that the threat actually caused the person threatened 'to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety,' and (5) that the threatened person's fear was 'reasonabl[e]' under the circumstances." (Id. at pp. 227-228, quoting Pen. Code, 422, subd. (a).)

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