California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Humphreys, B283579 (Cal. App. 2019):
supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 119-120.) "[D]efendant must show that a substantial danger of prejudice compelled severance. [Citation.]" (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 531.) The following factors may show an abuse of discretion in refusing to sever charges: "'(1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a "weak" case has been joined with a "strong" case, or with another "weak" case, so that the "spillover" effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315.)
"Cross-admissibility is the crucial factor affecting prejudice. [Citation.] If evidence of one crime would be admissible in a separate trial of the other crime, prejudice is usually dispelled. [Citation.]" (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 531-532.) In particular, prejudice is dispelled where one offense provides motive evidence admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1316.) Thus, the cross-admissibility of such evidence in this case favored consolidation, not severance, and dispelled any prejudice.
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