The following excerpt is from Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 891 N.E.2d 726 (N.Y. 2008):
preclude recovery as a matter of law" (McMorrow v. Trimper, 149 A.D.2d 971, 972, 540 N.Y.S.2d 106 [3d Dept.1989], affd. 74 N.Y.2d 830, 546 N.Y.S.2d 340, 545 N.E.2d 630 [1989]; cf. Gralton v. Oliver, 277 App.Div. 449, 101 N.Y.S.2d 109 [3d Dept.1950], affd. 302 N.Y. 864, 100 N.E.2d 49 [1951]). Under these circumstances, it is irrelevant that plaintiff was able to stop her vehicle without striking Officer Weidl's vehicle.
It is well settled that a "rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle" (Stalikas v. United Materials, 306 A.D.2d 810, 810, 760 N.Y.S.2d 804 [4th Dept 2003] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], affd. 100 N.Y.2d 626, 769
[891 N.E.2d 728]
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