What is the test for overturning convictions for rape and incest in a prosecution without corroborative evidence?

People v. Casillas (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 785, is similar to this case. There, a rape and incest victim in a prosecution without any corroborative evidence or incriminatory circumstances "gave three separate, distinct and contradictory versions as to who ravished her and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offenses." (Id. at p. 794.) On direct examination, she testified that she had sexual intercourse with her father twice; on cross-examination, she denied having sexual intercourse with her father and accused a boy of being responsible for her pregnancy; and on recross-examination, she testified that she had sexual intercourse with her father once and with the boy once. In reversing convictions for two counts of rape and two counts of incest against the father, the court noted that "an appellate court may set aside the findings of the trial court when there is no substantial or credible evidence in the record to support them or where the evidence relied upon by the prosecution is apparently so improbable or false as to be incredible." (Ibid.) It then explained: "That such a situation only presents itself in extreme cases we may concede, but we are convinced that the case at bar does not present the usual and ordinary situation where the evidence was in conflict as to the main or only issue, but on the contrary, tenders to us a case wherein the evidence is so lacking in substantiality as to truth or credibility that it falls far short of that quantum of verity, reasonableness and substantiality required by law in criminal cases to satisfy the reason and judgment of those bound to act conscientiously upon it as to the existence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. It must, therefore, be regarded as amounting to no evidence at all, as a matter of law, sufficient to overcome the

Page 45