What is the test for obtaining the consent of a prosecutor to determine that an offense is a misdemeanor rather than a felony?

In the years after Tenorio, we have applied its rationale to several analogous situations. In Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 119, 122, 95 Cal.Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140, this court held that a statute requiring a magistrate to secure a prosecutor's consent to determine that an offense is a misdemeanor rather than a felony violates the separation of powers doctrine (see Pen.Code, 17, subd. (b)). We said: "Since the exercise of a judicial power may not be conditioned upon the approval of either the executive or legislative branches of government, requiring the district attorney's consent in determining the charge on which a defendant shall be held to answer violates the doctrine of separation of powers." (Esteybar v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 127, 95 Cal.Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140.)