What is the test for legislative acquiescence in the context of a statutory construction rule?

It violates a threshold statutory construction rule when it proceeds directly to a discussion of legislative history without addressing or even quoting the plain language of the statute ( id., at 652). Their reliance on the principle and cases noting legislative acquiescence by awareness of judicial interpretations is rebuffed by our direct holding in the classic case of (Matter of Hellerstein v. Assessor of Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 371 N.Y.S.2d 388, 332 N.E.2d 279 [per Wachtler, J.], supra ) where we said: "the application of this principle [of legislative acquiescence] presupposes first, that the statute is capable of more than one interpretation, and secondly, that our court has not previously resolved the ambiguity". Neither of those two conditions is present to make the majority's major premise operative in this case.