What is the test for evidence of intoxication in a criminal case?

"Having stated the general rule, however, the court in Hood concluded that this definition should not be applied mechanically and was insufficient to resolve the question before the court, because the crime of assault could equally well be characterized as either a specific or a general intent crime. [Citation.] The court thus concluded that 'the decision whether or not to give effect to evidence of intoxication [in a prosecution for assault] must rest on other considerations.' [Citation.]" (People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 449, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272.)

A "compelling consideration" in Hood was the effect of intoxication on human behavior. (People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 458, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370.)

"A general intent crime may also involve a specific mental state, such as knowledge." (People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 380, 280 Cal.Rptr. 146.) "Among the several definitions of 'knowledge' are the following: 'the fact or condition of being cognizant, conscious, or aware of something'; 'the scope of one's awareness'; 'extent of one's understanding'; 'the fact or condition of apprehending truth, fact, or reality immediately with the mind or senses.' [Citations.]" (People v. Foster (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 649, 655, 97 Cal.Rptr. 94.) In People v. Foster, where unlawful possession of narcotics was charged, the court held, "[i]t is apparent that to convict the accused of the crime ..., the People must, in addition to proving general intent to possess the substance constituting the contraband, prove that the accused had knowledge that the material in his possession was a narcotic." (Id. at p. 655, 97 Cal.Rptr. 94.) In determining the latter, "[i]ntoxication has obvious relevance to the question of awareness, familiarity, understanding and the ability to recognize and comprehend." (Ibid.)

[52 Cal.App.4th 984] In People v. Whitfield, supra, 7 Cal.4th 437, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272, the court held that evidence of voluntary intoxication was admissible, notwithstanding classification of the crime--murder in the second degree based on implied malice--as one of general intent. "Malice is implied ' "when a person does an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.... [Citations.]" ' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 450, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272.) The court reasoned, "Although it can be argued that implied malice does not constitute a specific intent as described in Hood because it does not involve an 'intent to do

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