What is the test for denying fundamental due process of law in the context of a defendant's claim that the conditions of his confinement constitute punishment in advance of judgment?

22. To the extent defendant contends that the conditions of his confinement constituted a denial of fundamental due process of law in that they constituted punishment in advance of judgment (see Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 534, 547-548, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447), we note that a trial court properly defers to a great extent to the judgment of jail authorities regarding the conditions of a pretrial detainee's confinement. (Id. at pp. 540, fn. 23, 547-548, 99 S.Ct. 1861.) The court generally defers to such authorities regarding restraints on the defendant's liberty if these restraints are reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose such as to ensure the defendant's presence at trial or to meet institutional security needs and the need for internal order and discipline (Id. at pp. 536-540, 547-548, 99 S.Ct. 1861) unless there is substantial evidence in the record to indicate that such conditions impose restraints that are excessive relative to the legitimate governmental purpose. (Id. at p. 548, 99 S.Ct. 1861.) The record suggests strongly that the conditions imposed upon defendant related to legitimate governmental purposes, and in any event his claim has little to do with the validity of the judgment entered against him if his right to a fair trial otherwise was observed.