What is the test for denial of substantive due process in a civil case?

Most clearly, this scenario does not give rise to a valid denial of substantive due process claim. Admittedly, the standards that have been set out to identify substantive due process violations are somewhat hazy. See Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir.1986). Nevertheless, we cannot say that the official conduct here "offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses." Id. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169, 72 S.Ct. 205, 208, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)). The conduct was not "brutal," nor was it so egregious as to "shock the conscience." Id. This does not mean that we condone chicanery or abusive conduct on the part of government officials, nor does it mean that we find such abuses occurred here. We merely hold that the assumed conduct does not approach violating substantive due process concerns.