What is the test for deferential abuse of the standard in awarding an anti-SLAPP attorney fee?

We review an anti-SLAPP attorney fee award under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1130.) The trial court's fee determination " ' "will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong." ' " (Id. at p. 1132.) An attorney fee dispute is not exempt from generally applicable appellate principles: "The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct; all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support the judgment; conflicts in the declarations must be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and the trial court's resolution of any factual disputes arising from the evidence is conclusive." (In re Marriage of Zimmerman (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 556, 561-562.) We may not reweigh on appeal a trial court's assessment of an attorney's declaration (Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613, 622-623) and it is for the trial court "to assess credibility and resolve any conflicts in the evidence. Its findings . . . are entitled to great weight. Even though contrary findings could have been made, an appellate court should defer to the factual determinations made by the trial court when the evidence is in

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