What is the test for consent in sexual assault cases?

As the appellate court explained in Ireland, where a woman's cooperation is induced by force or fear, she is not required to communicate her lack of consent, even though she initially had agreed, before being threatened with a knife, to perform sexual acts for a fee: "The essence of consent is that it is given out of free will. That is why it can be withdrawn. While there exists a defense to rape based on the defendant's actual and reasonable belief that the victim does consent (People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1148; People v. Mayberry [(1975)] 15 Cal.3d [143,] 153-158), we do not require that victims communicate their lack of consent. (See People v. Maury[, supra,] 30 Cal.4th 342, 403 [lack of consent need not be proven by direct testimony but may be inferred from use of force or duress].) We certainly do not require that victims resist. (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1024-1025.) Yet this is what appellant proposes here. At the time of the offenses, appellant told his victims to cooperate or be hurt. Now he contends they were required to express to him their lack of cooperation. That cannot be the law. When appellant used the knife and expressly or impliedly

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threatened his victims, and in the absence of any conduct by the victims indicating that they continued to consent, the previously given consent no longer existed, either in fact or in law. (Cf. People v. Washington (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 609, 610 ['[c]onsent induced by fear is no consent at all'].)" (Ireland, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 338, fn. omitted.)