What is the test for admitting threat evidence in a sexual assault case where a witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation?

witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation is admissible because it bears on credibility" [citing cases]; see also People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1368-1369 ["A witness who testifies despite fear of recrimination of any kind by anyone is credible because of his or her personal stake in the testimony[,] . . . [and] the fact a witness is testifying despite fear of recrimination is important to fully evaluating his or her credibility"].)

The trial court, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, ruled that the probative value of this relevant threat evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect, subject to a limiting instruction that the jury could only consider the letters for the purpose of showing the victim's "state of mind, attitude, actions, bias, prejudice, presence or lack thereof of any of those factors," and "may consider those letters only for that purpose and for no other" [italics added]. "Jurors are presumed . . . to have followed the court's instructions. [Citation]" (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.) Because the jury was clearly and unambiguously instructed in this manner, and we assume they followed the instruction as given, we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury received the letters as evidence of defendant's consciousness of guilt by inferring he was responsible for them. (See People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 848 ["Challenges to the wording of jury instructions are resolved by determining whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied or misconstrued the instruction"].) Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the threat evidence subject to the limiting instruction that the jury could only consider it for the purpose of assessing witness credibility.⁴

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