What is the test for admitting or excluding "propensity" evidence in a sexual assault case?

^2. In part, Falsetta held that while "trial courts may no longer deem 'propensity' evidence unduly prejudicial per se," they "must engage in a careful weighing process under section 352." (People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 916-917.) As to this process, it stated: "Rather than admit or exclude every sex offense a defendant commits, trial judges must consider such factors as its nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendant's other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the offense." (Id. at p. 917.) The requirement that trial courts undertake a careful section 352 analysis "save[d] section 1108 from defendant's due process challenge" and "strongly support[ed]" section 1108's constitutionality. (Id. at p. 916.) " 'With this check upon the admission of evidence of uncharged sex offenses in prosecutions for sex crimes, we find that . . . section 1108 does not violate the due process clause.' " (Id. at p. 918, italics omitted.)

^3. Section 1108 provides: "In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." ( 1108, subd. (a); People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 40.)