What is the test for admitting evidence of an uncharged crime?

than those for which he is on trial is admissible when it is logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference relevant to prove some fact at issue, such as . . . intent . . . .' " (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 667.) Generally, its admission depends on " '(1) the materiality of the facts sought to be proved, (2) the tendency of the uncharged crimes to prove those facts, and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion of the evidence.' " (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 783.)

" 'The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. [Citation.] . . . [T]he uncharged conduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant " 'probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.' " ' " (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1328.) In determining if uncharged prior act evidence is relevant to show a common plan or scheme, "the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual." (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403, superseded by statute in part on other grounds as stated in People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 991.)

"Evidence of uncharged offenses 'is so prejudicial that its admission requires extremely careful analysis.' " (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.) Thus, consistent with Evidence Code section 352, "[t]he probative value of the uncharged offense evidence must be substantial and must not be largely outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a serious danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 371.)

We review a trial court's rulings under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 326.) We will not disturb a ruling " ' " 'unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' " ' " (Ibid.)

Page 11